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Intersection and Divergence: Some
Reflections on the Warren Court,
Civil Rights, and the First Amendment
Lillian R. BeVier*
During Chief Justice Warren's tenure, a substantial body of First Amend-
ment law emerged from the struggle to secure racial equality, and in several
instances the Court seemed quite self-consciously to shape First Amendment
doctrines so that freedom of speech would be an important arrow in the civil
rights movement's quiver. Put another way, the Court protected the civil
liberties of free speech and association to promote the civil right of racial
equality. In 1965, Harry Kalven elucidated this development in his book The
Negro and the First Amendment.' Kalven was an astute and sympathetic
observer of both First Amendment doctrine and the civil rights movement, and
when his book appeared, its civil rights perspective shed fresh light on, and
lent a nice coherence to, the then-developing First Amendment law of libel,
anonymity, privacy, freedom of association, trespass, and the public forum.
As I reflected on what I might contribute to this Symposium's attempt to
assess the Warren Court's jurisprudential legacy, it occurred to me that it
might be fruitful to inquire into the progeny of some of the First Amendment
cases2 that Kalven analyzed in order to study how the First Amendment
doctrines played out in contexts other than the civil rights movement. I also
believe it is important to observe what has become of the Warren Court's
assumption that liberty of speech for all is indispensable to, and indeed is a
crucial measure of, the extent to which we have secured civil rights for all.
Accordingly, I set for myself the task of trying to discern what has become of
the Warren Court's most notable First Amendment case, New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,3 and to discover what doctrines emerged from the Court's efforts
John S. Shannon Distinguished Professor and Class of 1964 Research Professor at the
University of Virginia Law School.
1. HARRY KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Phoenix ed., Univ. of
Chicago Press 1966) (1965).
2. Obviously I could only attend to some of them, as I had not set out to write a sequel
to Kalven's book.
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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to protect civil rights demonstrators when they took their protest to streets and
lunch counters across the South.4
The analysis that follows does not assign full responsibility to Warren
Court precedents for the shambles that is today's First Amendment. The
Symposium invitation - to assess "the jurisprudential legacy" of the Warren
Court - does seem to suggest that a genuine, discernible, but-for causal chain
directly links today's First Amendment doctrine to cases from the Warren
Court era. And of course a certain sense exists in which, simply by virtue of
the commands of stare decisis and the nature of precedent, the decisions of
earlier cases "cause" outcomes to be what they are in later cases. Later cases
"inherit" the earlier ones, and stare decisis requires later courts to address the
law embodied in precedents set by earlier courts - by adhering to them, by
overruling them, or by distinguishing them.5 So later cases represent earlier
courts' "legacy," willy nilly. But thinking about how to compare later First
Amendment cases to those decided by the Warren Court brings to the surface
intractable puzzles about the nature and significance of the causal link between
the two. The puzzles have to do with the extent to which one can confidently
trace current First Amendment doctrine back to the Warren Court. I do not
claim to have solved these puzzles. Indeed, having identified them and noted
their intractability, I decided to finesse the causal question almost entirely.
Confident causal attributions are problematic because assessing the
present in terms of the Warren Court past poses the notoriously indeterminate
"nature vs. nurture," or "heredity vs. environment," puzzle. The Warren Court
precedents are - of course - part of today's First Amendment's genetic mate-
rial. But what the First Amendment has become since the Warren Court surely
has as much to do with the philosophy ofthe Justices who have sat on the Court
since Chief Justice Warren's time, with the kinds of First Amendment issues
they have confronted, and with the nature of the claimants who have sought
First Amendment protection for their activities as it does with its precedential
inheritance. In his book, Kalven observed with considerable accuracy that "it
would not be a bad summary of the last three decades of First Amendment
issues in the Court to say simply: Jehovah Witnesses, Communists,
Negroes."6 He did not observe, but could have with equal accuracy, that most
of the First Amendment claimants in those three decades presented claims that
4. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-85 (1964) (establishing in
course of reversing civil damage award to public officials criticized for alleged civil rights
violations, new First Amendment doctrine for defamation claims by public officials).
5. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern
of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IoWA L. REV. 601, 604 (2001) (stating that
"'path dependence' means that an outcome or decision is shaped in specific and systematic ways
by the historical path leading to it").
6. KALVEN, supra note 1, at 135-36.
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went to the core of what the First Amendment was about.7 Between 1968,
when Chief Justice Warren retired, and 2002, the cast of characters became
much more diverse, and their claims to First Amendment vindication have
often - though of course not always - invoked peripheral rather than core
values.' The cast of characters now includes, among others, purveyors of
indecent, obscene, and pornographic materials,9 the institutional press and
other mass media corporations," commercial advertisers,1  anti-war
7. Some First Amendment claims involved political protests. See Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 6 (1949) (finding that ordinance which forbade speech intended to invite
dispute violated First Amendment); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 518 (1939) (finding unconsti-
tutional decree that forbade distribution of literature containing viewpoints on NLRB and that
placed conditions upon right to hold public meetings). Others involved advocacy of violent
overthrow of the government. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951)
(finding that Sections 2 and 3 of Smith Act, in so far as they prohibited advocating violent
overthrow of government, did not violate protections of First Amendment). And still other
claims involved religious proselytizing. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,307 (1940)
(finding that statute which required certificate to solicit support for religious cause was prior
restraint on exercise of religion).
8. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002) (finding laws
banning virtual child pornography overinclusive and in violation of First Amendment); Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 565 (2001) (finding regulation of certain outdoor tobacco
advertising in violation of First Amendment); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296
(2000) (finding ordinance banning completely nude dancing content neutral and permissible).
9. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 47-53 (1986) (finding
content-neutral zoning ordinance for sexually explicit theaters constitutional); Young .v. Am.
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62-63 (1976) (concluding that zoning ordinance that regulated
location of adult entertainment establishments was not prior restraint on speech and thus not
violative of First Amendment).
10. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997) (Turner I1)
(finding that must-carry rules for cable operators serve compelling government interest and do
not violate First Amendment); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661-62 (1994)
(Turner 1) (finding that must-carry provisions for cable operators are content-neutral regulations
but that government must demonstrate compelling interest before regulations are valid under
First Amendment); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 591-93 (1983) (concluding that Minnesota tax on ink and paper violated First Amendment
because it singled out press and targeted small group of newspapers); Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607-11 (1982) (invalidating on First Amendment grounds statute that
provided for mandatory closure during testimony of minor victim in sex offense trial); Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980) (concluding that absent
compelling government interest, trial judge's order barring public and press from criminal trial
violated First Amendment).
11. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,512 (1981) (determin-
ing that ordinance restricting off-site commercial speech on billboards is constitutional).
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protesters, 2 misusers of the flag,'" political parties and other campaign
organizations,' 4 public forum seekers," anti-abortion protesters,' 6 government-
subsidized speakers, 7 religious speakers (from Christians 8 to the International
Society for Krishna Consciousness19), outright racists,2" and - just to keep the
Justices awake - a fair number of nude dancers. 1 As even this partial list of
12. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (finding that expletive written
on jacket regarding its owner's criticism of military draft was protected speech).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-19 (1990) (finding that Flag
Protection Act of 1989, which prohibited all flag burning except for disposal, violated speech
rights under First Amendment).
14. See, e.g., FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431,465 (2001)
(Colorado HI) (holding that party's "coordinated expenditures, unlike expenditures truly
independent, may be restricted to minimize circumvention of contribution limits"); Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 614-18 (1996) (Colorado 1) (finding
that statute limiting party expenditures on United States Senate campaign violated First
Amendment); Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222-29 (1989)
(holding that California statutes prohibiting primary endorsements by political parties violated
First and Fourteenth Amendments because no compelling government interest to silence such
speech existed); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 224-25 (1986) (finding
that statute limiting primary elections to party members violated party's First Amendment right
of association); FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 490-501
(1985) (declaring that statute prohibiting independent political committees from spending more
than $1000 on presidential campaign violated First Amendment); FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work
Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1982) (finding that Congress's interest in regulating campaign
contributions of unions outweighed NRWC's interest in association).
15. See, e.g., Oreer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (determining that regulations
limiting distribution of pamphlets and prohibiting political speeches without prior approval at
Fort Dix posed no constitutional problem).
16. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753,768-73 (1994) (finding
Florida law creating buffer zones and noise restrictions around abortion clinics constitutional).
17. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542-49 (2001) (finding rules
prohibiting government subsidized welfare attorneys from challenging existing welfare law on
behalf of their indigent clients violated First Amendment).
18. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111-12 (2001) (concluding
that school's exclusion of Christian club from use of school premises was "impermissible
viewpoint discrimination").
19. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683-85
(1992) (determining that regulations limiting solicitation of funds to areas outside airport
terminals were reasonable).
20. See, e.g., RAN. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,380-81 (1992) (finding ordinance
used to convict cross-burning teens violated First Amendment because ordinance "prohibit[ed]
otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subject the speech addresses").
21. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1991) (finding Indiana
law requiring nude dancers to wear pasties and G-strings constitutional because it aimed to
combat nudity in general and not expression); Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,
76-77 (1981) (overturning convictions of adult bookstore owners who provided live nude
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contestants suggests, First Amendment litigation has become "a stage upon
which practically the entire dramatic repertoire of contemporary American life
could be played out. 22 It would surely overstate the matter to suggest that the
entire dramatic repertoire of contemporary American life represents "the
jurisprudential legacy" of the Warren Court. Likewise, it would be a mistake
to attribute the First Amendment doctrines that the Court has developed in
response to these various dramas solely to the Warren Court's jurisprudence.
It seems just plain reckless even to venture a guess as to how much attribution
is enough, although it is probably wrong to assert that there are so many
independent causes of today's decisions that no causal link exists between the
Warren Court's First Amendment and today's. Because the causal questions
present so many imponderables, the analysis that follows will not draw causal
conclusions. It will instead consist simply of an inquiry into what has become
of some of the key First Amendment initiatives that the Warren Court under-
took.
In offering the following observations about what has become of some
of the Warren Court's First Amendment-civil rights cases that Kalven so
brilliantly analyzed, I implicitly give short shrift to the view that changes in
Court composition have been outcome-determinative or even that they can be
usefully explanatory. Unrealistic as ignoring this particular causal factor may
seem to some, short shrift is warranted. The judicial philosophy of individual
Justices is of course not irrelevant to the conclusions they reach and the
outcomes they endorse, but the process by which individual philosophies
coalesce to forge general doctrines and generate particular results is almost
completely opaque to the outside observer. The only incontestible evidence
of the Warren Court's jurisprudential legacy that we possess resides in that
Court's written opinions - they are what constitutes the Warren Court's
jurisprudence - and in the opinions of succeeding Courts, which represent its
jurisprudential legacy. Accordingly, the decisions themselves will be my
chief data points. In particular, I shall look at what has become of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan and of the cases involving speech in public places. New
York Times Co. was an important and obvious exemplar of the Court's use of
the First Amendment to protect the civil rights movement,23 and the "speech
dancing because commercial zone regulations violated First Amendment); California v. LaRue,
409 U.S. 109, 114-19 (1972) (finding that regulations placed on licensed bars prohibiting
certain sexually explicit activities were constitutional under Twenty-first Amendment).
22. Lillian R. BeVier, Free Expression in the Warren and Burger Courts, 25 J. SUP. CT.
HIST. 191,192 (2000).
23. See N.Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 301 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (acknowledging that
Alabama libel laws impacted First Amendment freedoms in race relations context and thus
concurring in judgment to restrict libel damages for public official to cases that show proof of
actual malice).
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in public places" cases that the Warren Court decided offer additional evi-
dence of an underlying civil rights agenda at work.24 The jurisprudential
legacy of neither New York Times Co. nor the speech in public places cases
is, I venture to guess, what one would have expected - or, perhaps, what the
Warren Court itself might have hoped.
One more preliminary comment is in order. The focus on the Warren
Court's jurisprudential legacy seems to imply that we are assaying what has
become of the parts of the law in which Chief Justice Warren himself exerted
notable jurisprudential leadership. But the Warren Court's First Amendment
decisions do not appear to exemplify Chief Justice Warren's jurisprudential
leadership. Chief Justice Warren rarely wrote in First Amendment cases, and
the opinions he did write were seldom doctrinally innovative. Although his
Court decided many seminal First Amendment cases, the Chief wrote but one
major opinion announcing a new turn in the law. He wrote for the Court in
United States v. 0 'Brien,25 in which the Court sustained the federal statute
that banned draft-card burning and announced a "test" that, although often
cited, could hardly be characterized as either illustrative or a high-water mark
of the Warren Court's First Amendment jurisprudence:
[W]hen "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same
course ofconduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulat-
ing the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms .... [A] governmental regulation is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the govern-
mental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and ifthe
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.26
In terms of the First Amendment, the jurisprudential legacy of the Warren
Court was left not by the Chief himself, but rather by Justice Brennan and,
surprisingly perhaps, by the conservative Justice Harlan.
Let us begin with Justice Brennan's masterful and doctrinally innovative
opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, a paradigmatic example of Warren
Court First Amendment jurisprudence in service of the civil rights cause. As
24. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 323-24 (1968) (finding injunction issued by court barring union protesters
from shopping center hindered communication of protesters' speech and that it violated First
Amendment); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (finding ordinance, which banned
leasing of hall without permit discretionarily issued by police chief, unconstitutionally infringed
on organization's speech rights). In Hague, Justice Roberts suggested that the First Amendment
guaranteed citizens the right to use public places for speech purposes. Id. at 515.
25. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
26. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
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all who have even a passing acquaintance with the First Amendment know,
in New York Times Co. the Court began the process of constitutionalizing the
law of defamation.27 It held that the First Amendment "prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual
malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not.1
28
The case was almost as much a civil rights case as it was a First Amend-
ment case because, as the Court well knew, it involved '"te application of the
libel laws to the Negro critics of Southern treatment of the protest move-
ment,"2 9 and the Court's sweeping new First Amendment doctrine protected
the critics. Its civil rights ancestry no longer has any doctrinal impact, for it
is almost exclusively as a First Amendment case that it lives today. And the
feature of the case that exerts the most influence on today's First Amendment
jurisprudence is its memorable endorsement of a "profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open. 30
Three aspects of New York Times Co. warrant attention here. First, "[t]he
key source of insight for the Court ... comes from seditious libel - or rather
from what one might better call the negative radiations from seditious libel."'"
"[T]he lesson to be drawn from the great controversy over the Sedition Act of
1798, which first crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of
the First Amendment," said the Court, is that "neither factual error nor defama-
tory content suffices to remove the constitutional shield from criticism of
official conduct. 32 This insight provided the premise for the Court's decision.
The second noteworthy feature of New York Times Co. is that the Court
annulled the long-standing assumption that state defamation law did not raise
First Amendment issues. In 1942, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,33 the
Court described libel as a "well-defined and narrowly limited class[ I of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
27. See BeVier, supra note 22, at 205 ("[D]uring the Warren and Burger Court years, the
press received a very substantial reprieve. On account of the then unprecedented reading of the
First Amendment [in] New York Times v. Sullivan,... the press is liable for publishing false
defamatory statements of fact only when they have done so 'with actual malice.'").
28. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80.
29. KALvEN, supra note 1, at 53.
30. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270.
31. KALvEN, supra note l, at 57.
32. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 273 (citations omitted).
33. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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raise any Constitutional problem." '34 In 1952, it confirmed libel's unprotected
status in Beauharnais v. Illinois,3 5 noting that "[l]ibelous utterances not being
within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary... to
consider the issues behind the phrase 'clear and present danger.' ''3 In New
York Times Co., Justice Brennan brusquely distinguished these precedents on
purportedly factual grounds. Their holdings did not govern the present case,
he said, because "[n]one of [them] sustained the use of libel laws to impose
sanctions upon expression critical of the official conduct of public officials."37
But this factual distinction seems ultimately to have been rather beside the
point, given that Justice Brennan proceeded to declare unequivocally that
"libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It
must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment. "38 With this
bold stroke of Justice Brennan's confident pen, the Court signaled the
constitutionalization of an entire set of common law doctrines that it had
previously announced were beyond the Constitution's purview. 9 Even after
New York Times Co., much of state libel law would have remained intact had
the Court in later cases more strictly hewed to the limitation to seditious libel
that was implicit in granting a constitutional privilege to "expression critical
of the official conduct of public officials. 4 Instead of limiting the New York
Times Co. privilege to criticism of government officials, however, the Court
three years later extended it to defamatory statements about public figures
who held no public office.4 The Court recognized that the seditious libel
analogy was inapt in this context, and the asserted grounds for extending the
privilege had almost nothing to do with the potential for government to quell
criticism of itself by punishing seditious libel.42 Rather, the Court thought it
34. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
35. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
36. Beauhamaii v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
37. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 268.
38. Id. at 269.
39. See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 266-67 (concluding that Illinois law outlawing criminal
libel was not constitutionally objectionable); ChalIinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (holding that
prevention and punishment of certain classes of speech could be done without raising constitu-
tional problems).
40. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at268.
41. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (holding that "a 'public
figure' who is not a public official may also recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose
substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable
conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting
ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers").
42. Id. at 154.
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dispositive that distinctions between government officials and private actors
had become blurred to the point that many individuals who do not hold public
office are influential in resolving important public questions or are simply
famous enough to play an important role in setting society's agenda."3 Thus,
what mattered was not that there be more speech about government but rather
that there be more speech, period.
The third noteworthy aspect of New York Times Co. is the extent to
which it reflects the Warren Court's determination to engage in strategic First
Amendment rule-making. Kalven viewed the New York Times Co. privilege
to make false statements of fact as very much akin to a bargain with the
devil." Justice Brennan thought the bargain necessary because true speech
and political opinions, which have considerable First Amendment value, were
likely to be deterred if the Court permitted the common law rule imposing
strict liability for false statements of fact to stand.45 Therefore, in return for
a rule that would deter less true speech than would the common law rule, the
Court was willing to immunize some false speech.46 The Court had concluded
that it was necessary to overprotect speech - in New York Times Co. by privi-
leging some false speech - to protect "speech that matters, 'i4 that is, true
speech and opinions about the official conduct of public officials.
4
The deliberately strategic approach to First Amendment rule-making that
New York Times Co. exemplifies had first emerged in two cases decided the
same day in 1958, Speiser v. Randall9 and NAACP v. Alabama.0 These two
43. See id. at 155 (finding that private persons had sufficient public interest and access
to means of counterargument to expose falsehood of defamatory statements).
44. See KALVEN, supra note 1, at 53 ("On its facts, the Times case seems to have been put
together by the Devil himself in order to embarrass the legal system.").
45. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S at 279 (describing stifling effect on speech of rule
requiring critic to prove veracity of his allegations).
46. See id. at 271-72 ("[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and. . . it must
be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need ...
to survive .... ."') (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963)).
47. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,341 (1974).
48. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 271 ("The constitutional protection [of speech] does
not turn upon 'the truth... of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.'" (quoting Button, 371
U.S. at 445)).
49. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958) (concluding that statute requiring
filing of oath that applicant did not advocate violent overthrow of government was unconstitu-
tional because it placed burden on taxpayer to prove he was not member of class denied tax
exemption).
50. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958) (finding production order
issued by Alabama court requiring that NAACP turn over membership lists unconstitutional
because it conflicted with members' right of association under First Amendment).
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Warren Court decisions, with opinions written by Justices Harlan and Brennan
respectively, proved genuinely catalytic. They:
broadened the Court's First Amendment horizon and adumbrated a concep-
tion of the Court's function that requires the justices to be engineers of a
system of free speech rights, that charges them to identify and forestall the
effect of hitherto disregarded imperfections in seemingly carefully de-
signed regulatory efforts and that requires them to craft rules that purport
to take realistic account of the incentives confronting all the affected
actors. Both opinions implicitly set out not merely to preserve formal
freedom but to encourage - or at the very least not predictably to discour-
age - its exercise. 1
And in New York Times Co., the same conception of the Court's task was
clearly at work.
But what has been the jurisprudential legacy of New York Times Co., and
in particular of these three noteworthy aspects of the case? Put bluntly, New
York Times Co. 's direct progeny and their close cousins, namely the First
Amendment cases dealing with libel and privacy, are for the most part an
undistinguished lot of surprisingly trivial cases clothed in ill-fitting but by now
wholly conventional-seeming First Amendment garb. Constitutional con-
straints now govern much of the substantive common law of defamation 2 and
most aspects of libel litigation. 3
Since Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 4 however, the doctrinal develop-
ments have taken place in disregard - perhaps in reckless disregard - of the
seditious libel analogy that gave the doctrine birth.5 There is irony in this fact.
Although conventional wisdom has it that since and perhaps even on account
51. BeVier, supra note 22, at 200.
52. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763
(1985) (concluding that when defamatory statements involve no issue of public concern, states
may award presumed and punitive damages even absent showing of actual malice); Gerz, 418
U.S. at 346-47 (holding that First Amendment prohibits states from imposing liability without
fault in defamation cases brought by private individuals, although New York Times Co. privilege
does not apply in such cases).
53. See, e.g., Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (finding that
plaintiff must bear burden of proof of falsity before he may recover damages from media
defendant); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)
(concluding standard of review for "actual malice" should comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a) and rule of independent review applied in New York Times Co.).
54. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
55. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S 130, 155 (1967) (holding that public figure
who is not public official may recover damages for defamation so long as danger to reputation
is apparent and conduct of media was "highly unreasonable" in that it departed from normal
standards of reporting and investigation).
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of New York Times Co., "the avoidance of seditious libel [has become] the
'central meaning' of the First Amendment,"56 such avoidance is most certainly
not the central meaning of the Court's post-New York Times Co. defamation
jurisprudence. Indeed, I would argue that post-New York Times Co. defama-
tion jurisprudence has neither a central First Amendment meaning nor a
discernible core. It consists rather of a series of decisions in which the Court
has engaged in case-by-case balancing of the need to avoid self-censorship
against the state's interest in compensating individuals for harm occasioned
by defamatory falsehood.5  And neither the decisions nor the opinions give
any hint that the Court has been moved, in any of its subsequent crafting of
doctrinal details, by a broader, if unspoken, civil rights agenda.
New York Times Co. 's jurisprudential legacy is, however, more signifi-
cant than the hodge-podge of supposedly constitutionally mandated adjust-
ments to the common law of libel might suggest. In fact, quite apart from its
lineal descendants, Justice Brennan's opinion has exerted a profound influ-
ence on the Court's general approach to First Amendment questions. In a
wide variety of contexts other than defamation, for example, the Court contin-
ues to craft doctrines based on the assumption of a strategic mission to over-
protect speech.5" To be sure, the Court first embarked on this mission as early
as the 1958 cases of NAACP v. Alabama59 and Speiser v. Randall.60 In the
former case, the Court protected the right of association by protecting NAACP
membership lists;6' in the latter, the Court found unconstitutional a requirement
that veterans who sought a tax credit take an oath that they did not support
violent overthrow of the government.62 However, New York Times Co. gave
the Court's mission to overprotect speech unprecedented rhetorical momen-
tum. Few First Amendment phrases have been so often invoked as Justice
Brennan's ringing bndorsement of our "profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open,"63 and few ideas have taken so firm a root in First Amendment doctrine
56. KALVEN, supra note 1,at 58.
57. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-42 (1974) (noting Court's
continuing "effort to define proper accommodation between these competing concerns").
58. See id. at 341 ("The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood to
protect speech that matters.").
59. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
60. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
61. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,462-63 (1958) (finding that compelling state
interest in securing membership lists did not outweigh members' right of association).
62. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958) (concluding that state oath require-
ment for veteran's tax credit violated veteran's right to free speech).
63. N.Y. Times Co.,376 U.S. at 270.
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as the idea that speech is so important that constitutional doctrine must create
as few incidents of unearned deterrence as possible.
A second Warren Court context in which freedom of speech principles
and values seemed to intersect with - and have the potential to be put to the
service of- the civil rights movement involved speech in public places. Civil
rights advocates took to the streets in the early 1960s, in what Kalven described
in 1965 as "a massive self-help movement... [that was] imaginative, tactful,
effective, and the news story of the [first-half] of the decade."'  Kalven also
noted that "[s]etting the legal limits to the Negro use of self-help [was] one of
the great legal issues of [the] day."I As things turned out, however, this legal
issue proved to be, for the most part, a First Amendment dog that did not bark.
Demonstrators at privately owned places that were opened to the public
for purposes of commerce presented the first "speech in public places" issue
to emerge from the civil rights movement. Sit-ins at privately owned lunch
counters in the South were a common form of self-help, and they often led to
the arrest and state court conviction of the protesters. The Warren Court
managed to overturn all of the convictions of the sitters-in without ever directly
confronting, much less answering, the important constitutional questions they
posed.' The broadest question these cases posed was framed in equal protec-
tion rather than First Amendment terms. It was whether state enforcement of
a "neutral" trespass law at the instance of a racially motivated private owner
constitutes "state action" for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.67 A second question was framed as a free speech
issue. It was whether the First Amendment, made applicable to the states by
the Fourteenth, protects protesters and demonstrators on private property that
the owner has opened to the public for purposes of commerce. 6 The passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and in particular of the Public Accommoda-
tions title, mooted the first question, enabling the Court permanently to finesse
64. KALVEN, supra note 1, at 124. The news story of the second half of the decade was,
of course, the Vietnam War.
65. Id. at 125.
66. See generally Monrad 0. Paulsen, The Sit-In Cases of 1964: "But Answer Came
There None," 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 137 (describing and defending Court's refusal to reach central
question of extent to which Fourteenth Amendment forbids states to support private choices that
could not constitutionally be made by judiciary, executive, or legislature).
67. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 227-28 (1964) (reviewing trespass convic-
tions of sitters-in at restaurant under neutral trespass law challenged as violating Fourteenth
Amendment and reversing convictions on nonconstitutional grounds).
68. Cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (finding that state cannot constitu-
tionally impose criminal punishment on person distributing religious literature on premises of




it."' The Warren Court flirted with a positive answer to the second question
when it held, in Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley
Plaza,7° that a state may not, "through the use of its trespass laws, wholly...
exclude [those] members of the public wishing to exercise their First Amend-
ment rights" in a privately owned shopping center where the protest proceeded
"in a manner and for a purpose generally consonant with the use to which the
property is actually put."'" But the Burger Court soon backtracked, squarely
holding that "the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression has no part
to play" in securing the right of access to private property for speech purposes,
even when that property is generally open to the public for business
purposes.72
The next cluster of issues presented by civil rights advocates' speech in
public places concerned publicly owned property. In the 1939 case of Hague
v. CIO," Justice Roberts penned his famous dictum suggesting that the First
Amendment guarantees citizens access to streets and parks for speech pur-
poses: "Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemori-
ally been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thought between citizens,
and discussing public questions. 74 In his 1965 book, Kalven proposed that
"in an open democratic society the streets, the parks, and other public places
are an important facility for public discussion and political process. They are
in brief a public forum that the citizen can commandeer."" He recognized
that if the Court were to confront such a proposition, "[t]he test question
[would be] whether the state can bar the use of public places for speech
altogether... in the interest of other uses of the facility. "76 Some Justices
urged that any governmental attempt to prohibit First Amendment activity on
publicly owned property - whether a traditional public forum or not - should
be subject to close judicial scrutiny to determine whether the proposed speech
would be "basically compatible with the activities otherwise occurring"
69. The Court sustained the public accommodations title, Title 11, as a valid exercise of
the power to regulate interstate commerce. It has never had to decide whether to overrule The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), which held that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not give Congress power to enact a public accommodations law.
70. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
71. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308,319-20 (1968), overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
72. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 521.
73. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
74. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
75. KALVEN, supra note 1, at 185 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 191.
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there." But the Warren Court signaled that the answer to Kalven's test
question was going to be yes - the state may bar the use of at least some
public places for speech altogether in the interests of those places' other uses,
and not every choice to bar speech would evoke careful review.
In Adderley v. Florida,78 the Court affirmed the convictions of student
demonstrators who went to the county jail to protest the arrest of their class-
mates and were themselves arrested when they refused to leave the jail
grounds. 9  Their failure to leave violated a Florida statute that declared
unlawful "every trespass upon the property of another, committed with a
malicious and mischievous intent."8°  In Justice Black's majority opinion
affirming the convictions, he wrote that the "state, no less than a private owner
of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use
to which it is lawfully dedicated."'" The deference to state regulator-owners
of non-public forum property implicit in Justice Black's statement gained
momentum and is for all practical purposes the standard operating procedure
today, at least when the challenged regulations are content- or viewpoint-
neutral and the public property is not a traditional public forum such as a
street or a park.82 In fact, in recent years the Court has sustained many regula-
tions of speech activity even in traditional public fora.3'
In regard to the Warren Court's jurisprudential legacy, there are at least
two ways to interpret the developments with respect to speech in public places.
77. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 860 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
79. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (affirming conviction for trespassing
on jail grounds).
80. Id. at 40 n.1.
81. Id. at47.
82. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 813
(1985) (sustaining executive order excluding legal defense and political advocacy organizations
from participation in Combined Federal Campaign, which is annual fund-raising drive con-
ducted during working hours in federal workplace); Perry Education Ass'n v. Peny Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983) (sustaining provision of school district collective
bargaining agreement granting access to district's interschool mail system to exclusive bargain-
ing representative of district's teachers, but to no other union); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of
reenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 133-34 (1981) (sustaining federal statute prohibiting
deposit of unstamped "mailable matter" in Postal Service-approved letter box).
83. See, e.g., Ward v. RockAgainst Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (sustaining New
York City regulation requiring use of city-provided sound systems and technicians for concerts
in Central Park's Bandshell); Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474,488 (1988) (sustaining ordinance
that prohibited picketing on residential street when picketing focuses on and takes place in front
of particular residence); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298-99
(1984) (sustaining application of regulation prohibiting camping in certain parks in Washington,
D.C., to protestors seeking to dramatize plight of homeless).
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From one perspective, they suggest that a significant aspect of the Warren
Court's legacy has withered. On this view, the recent "speech in public
places" cases represent a retreat from the conviction, exemplified in New York
Times Co., that First Amendment doctrine ought to be crafted so as to permit
"the widest possible opportunity for free expression." 4 According to this
perspective, if the Court still held this conviction, it would insist on subjecting
regulations and prohibitions of First Amendment activity on publicly owned
property to searching review in every case:
The crucial question [in every case would be] whether the manner of
expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity ofa particular
place at a particular time .... [I]n assessing the reasonableness of a
regulation, [the Court would] weigh heavily the fact that communication
is involved; the regulation [would have to be] narrowly tailored to further
the State's legitimate interest.83
Another interpretation of the Court's deference to regulators in public
and non-public fora puts the developing law in a more benign light. The
recent cases do not necessarily appear to reflect either a lack of enthusiasm
for, or a hostility toward, freedom of expression. Instead, they demonstrate
the Court's appreciation of the limits ofjudicial capacity and its unwillingness
to expend judicial resources for minimal First Amendment gains:
Although access to nonpublic forum public property might make some
speech marginally more effective, a denial ofaccess to such property poses
no real threat to the marketplace of ideas. But to require such access would
necessarily interfere with competing government interests and involve the
courts in an endless series of highly subjective and unpredictable judg-
ments. Thus, the costs of such inquiries far exceed the benefits."
If this interpretation is the more accurate perspective, the Court's present
unwillingness to apply strict scrutiny to all denials of access to publically
owned property can be seen as part of the Warren Court's jurisprudential
legacy - as the reaction of a more skeptical Court to the more free-wheeling,
judicially self-confident aspect of the Warren Court's jurisprudence.
84. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FRST AMENDMENT 306 (1999).
85. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17(1972).
86. STONE ET AL., supra note 84, at 306; see also Lillian R. BeVier, RehabilitatingPublic
Forum Doctrine: In Defense of Categories, 1992 SUP. CT. REv. 79, 113-22 (evaluating
advantages and disadvantages of denying access to publicly owned property).
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About so complex a topic as the jurisprudential legacy of the Warren
Court, and in the context of such a brief comment, sweeping generalizations
are inappropriate. I hope, however, that a couple of modest general observa-
tions will not be amiss.
Comparing the Warren Court's First Amendment cases with the Court's
more recent efforts reveals some striking contrasts. The differences between
the Warren Court's opinions and those that emanate from today's Court have
less to do with results and more to do with tone, style, and methodology.
During Chief Justice Warren's tenure, the Court's First Amendment perspec-
tive broadened considerably. When Chief Justice Warren came to the bench,
the First Amendment was hardly the bulwark of freedom it has since become.
The "clear and present danger test," for example, was the governing doctrine
with respect to regulations of speech advocating or inciting unlawful
conduct.8 7 "Clear and present danger" was never a truly speech-protective
test. And the Court effectively emasculated its ability to shield First Amend-
ment claimants in Dennis v. United States,"8 in which the Court permitted the
gravity of the evil to be discounted by its improbability, thus seemingly doing
away with the requirement that the Government prove that harm from speech
was imminent.8 9 And in 1953, the reigning methodology for deciding First
Amendment cases was ad hoc balancing, with only the occasional foot on the
First Amendment side of the scale." But while Earl Warren was Chief
Justice, the Court began to perceive that speech, especially speech about
government officials and public affairs, is a positive good in a democratic
society rather than a tiresome or trivial nuisance that nevertheless must
occasionally be tolerated.9' In addition, the Court began to perceive that law
is sometimes prone to systematic bias against speech and that it was the
Court's job to correct for such bias. Prompted by these perceptions, the Court
began self-consciously and deliberately to expand the First Amendment's
reach in order to craft doctrines that would both enshrine this expansion and
protect speakers from the chill of overbroad, vague, or viewpoint discrimina-
87. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503-08 (1951) (providing in-depth
analysis of "clear and present danger" test to speech of defendants who conspired to advocate
overthrow of government).
88. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
89. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (upholding convictions under
Smith Act for conspiring to overthrow government by organizing Communist Party).
90. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (invalidating anti-littering
ordinance on grounds that interest in free expression outweighed city's interest in keeping
streets clean).
91. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270 (affirming "profound national commitment to
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open").
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tory laws. This doctrinal expansion is striking in itself, of course, but what is
even more noteworthy is how much vitality the opinions display. Wholly
apart from whether they hew to conventional standards of the judicial craf,
they generate an impression of a Court vigorously engaged, grappling with
fundamental questions and confidently drawing new doctrinal boundaries.
The opinions are fun to read; they are lively; they are even occasionally
rhetorically memorable.
Fast forward to the present. The Burger and Relmquist Courts have
preserved most of the doctrinal expansion that the Warren Court began, and
they have even broadened the Amendment's coverage in some areas. But the
opinions are anything but lively, nor are they rhetorically memorable. They
tend rather to be wooden, stale, formulaic, tiresome to read - and windy.'
The Warren Court's approach has hardened into doctrines that consist of
"flagrantly proliferating and contradictory rules." '9 3 Three- or four-prong
"tests," whose applications lend to the opinions a mechanistic, bureaucratic
tone, abound.94 The tests themselves seem designed to give the impression
that they genuinely guide and constrain the Court's judgment, perhaps in
response to the frequently-expressed concern that the Warren Court's deci-
sions were too result-oriented, improvisational, and maybe even illegitimate.
Upon examination, however, today's First Amendment tests only serve
to disguise, rather than to dispel, the First Amendment's indeterminacy, and
they do little to constrain what one commentator called, in reference to the
Burger Court, the Court's "rootless activism."9" They offer few helpful
clues - even to the members of the Court, apparently - about how to answer
the hard questions.' Indeed, because they are not firmly tethered to any
92. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (including five
interminable opinions discussing First Amendment issues raised by Massachusetts's regulations
governing advertising and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco products, and cigars).
93. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
in ETERNALLYVIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 153 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey
R. Stone eds., 2002).
94. See, e.g., Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 54-55
(1983) (outlining, with regard to right of access to public property, three separate categories of
public property - traditional public forum, designated public forum, and nonpublic forum - and
discussing standard of review for denials of access to each respective categoiy); Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (announcing four-prong
test for commercial speech cases); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (revising
permissible scope of regulation of obscenity and laying down three guidelines for trier of fact).
95. Vincent Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER COURT:
THE COUNTER-REVOLuTON THAT WASN'T 217 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
96. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 257-58 (1997) (Turner II)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing 5-4 decision of Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
1091
59 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1075 (2002)
consistently applied and articulated theory of the First Amendment and
because the Court has developed no metric for weighing the substantiality of
the government's interest in particular regulatory schemes or for measuring
the harm that any proposed speech will do to the government's ability to
achieve its objectives, applying the tests requires the Court to make - but
unfortunately does not require it to defend - subjective judgment after subjec-
tive judgment after subjective judgment. To the extent that this phenomenon
represents an aspect of the Warren Court's jurisprudential legacy, it seems a
most unfortunate one indeed.
A second modest observation brings back the Warren Court's First
Amendment endeavors to advance the cause of the civil rights movement by
strengthening the First Amendment shield that protected the movement's
activities from unfriendly regulation. It's a fair bet that the Warren Court
never imagined that civil liberties and civil rights could ever be on a collision
course. The Justices between 1953 and 1968 seemed to think that a choice to
protect speech was almost by definition a choice that would promote equality.
Yet one of the most unhappy facts about the present day is that so many
scholars regard free speech as the enemy - or at least the potential enemy -
of civil rights, not its handmaiden. Many regard campus speech codes and
state and local regulations of hate speech, for example, as essential to the full
enjoyment of civil rights by historically disfavored groups, despite the fact
that they raise troublesome civil liberties issues under the First Amendment
as conventionally or traditionally understood.97 Many regard the regulation
of pornography - defined as the sexually explicit graphic depiction of the
subordination of women, without regard to whether it contains serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value that would require its protection under
prevailing First Amendment rules9s - as necessary to prevent serious harm to
622 (1994) (Turner I), in which majority held that must-carry provisions of Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 should receive only intermediate scrutiny,
but dissenters argued that must-carry rules were content based, that they deserved strict scrutiny,
and that majority went astray when it applied an "inappropriately lenient level of scrutiny...
[and] misapplie[d] the analytic framework it [chose]").
97. See, e.g., Charles Lawrence, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus, 1990 DUKE LI. 431, 438-40 (arguing that racist speech can be regulated pursuant
to Brown v. Board of Education because it stamps badge of inferiority upon blacks); Mari
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICK- L. REV
2320, 2357 (1989) (describing how racist speech should be treated as sui generis because it is
so hurtful and harmful that it does not belong within realm of protected speech).
98. See, e.g., Lorenne M.G. Clark, Liberalism and Pornography, in PORNOGRAPHY AND
CENSORSHIP 52-53 (David Copp & Susan Wendell eds., 1983) (describing how pornography
uses sexuality as instrument of oppression); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil
Rights and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 22 (1985) (defining pornography and
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women, a claim that amounts to an argument that free speech values are
antithetical to, and ought to be trumped by, women's interest in full equality.
This is not the occasion to delve into the details of the debates these
claims have engendered, nor to summarize the arguments that have been
made, nor to offer a possible resolution of the conflicting claims. It is an
occasion, however, to note the stark contrast between the mere fact of today's
perceived, irreconcilable conflict between civil rights and civil liberties with
the vision that the Warren Court embraced: of rights and liberties as two sides
of the same coin, in harmony with one another, expanding together rather than
at the expense of one another. The most painful question is whether today's
bitter disputes should be viewed as part of the Warren Court's jurisprudential
legacy - or as a betrayal of it.
indicating that it may cause measurable harm to women).
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